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ABSTRACT
CONTEMPORARY HUMAN DISPLACEMENT:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SYRIA, YEMEN, HONDURAS, AND VENEZUELA
by Rav Carlotti
Advisor: Mark Ungar
What is causing the surge in human displacement around the world?
displacement in Syria, Yemen, Honduras, and Venezuela has generated

Large-scale
unprecedented

humanitarian crises in Latin America and the Middle East as millions of displaced people end up as
refugees or immigrants. Humanitarian organizations like the UNHCR and host countries have had
their resources overextended by these ongoing crises, and there is no end in sight. This thesis
shows that contemporary human displacement is rooted is the increasingly inability of governments
to manage their societies amid great political demands and socio-economics strains. These causes
are difficult to tackle because they require far-reaching reforms in theses countries’ governments
and economies. While humanitarian aid is a beneficial stop gap measure to help displaced people, it
is a temporary solution. As this thesis will show, the only way to protect people in the long-term
is by working with the global communities to promote representative leadership and peaceful
resolution of political differences. The global community can also offer support to the government
to prevent militias and splinter groups from challenging its authority and putting the lives of
citizens at risk.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1: Introduction…………………………………………………………………………….. 1
Causes of Displacement…………………………………………………………………….. 3
Disaster-Induced Displacement…………………………………………………………… 4
Conflict Induced Displacement…………………………………………………………… 6
Chapter 2: Disintegration of the State and its Loss of Control Over Society ………………….… 8
Levels of State Disintegration………………………………………………………..…… 9
Yemen and Syria………………………………………………………………………….. 10
Yemen………………………………………………………………………………10
Syria……………………………………………………………………………..… 13
Chapter 3: Growing Autocracy…………………………………………………………………… 17
Honduras and Venezuela………………………………………………………………..… 28
Honduras………………………………………………………………………….. 28
Venezuela………………………………………………………………………… 35
Chapter 4: Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………… 40
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………… 43

v

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Displacement Causes Summary........................................................................................3
Table 2: Causes of Human Displacement in the 4 Countries..........................................................8
Table 3: Drivers for Decentralization and Disintegration .............................................................16
Table 4: How Society Disintegrates..............................................................................................17
Table 5: Violence Intensity in South American Nations...............................................................37

vi

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Chapter one: Introduction
Human displacement, which is also referred to as forced migration or forced displacement,
is the coerced and involuntary movement of people from their home area due to factors beyond
their control. The movement can result from a wide range of factors including population transfer,
deportation, civil war, persecution, ethnic cleansing, droughts, and natural disasters.1 The United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) limits the definition of human
displacement to the movement that is the result of human rights violations, generalized violence,
conflict, and persecution.2 The issue of forced displacement received attention in the policies and
discussions of the international community since the start of the European migrant crisis.3. Local,
regional, and international organizations are working towards preventing and addressing the effects
of human displacement in both origin and destination countries.
But why is human displacement so persistent? Given the long history, global extent, and
huge impacts of human displacement, why has the world been unable to stem it? Since the start of
the 21st century, in fact, the numbers may be at record levels. Currently, at least 60 million people most of them being from the southern part of the planet – are considered to be forcibly displaced.4
The goal of this thesis will be to comparatively investigate human displacement in modern times in
Syria, Yemen, Venezuela, and Honduras. Specifically, it will link quantitative trends, particularly

1

Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Elise Pizzi, “Natural Disasters, Forced Migration, and Conflict: The
Importance of Government Policy Responses,” International Studies Review (2020).
2

Tajamul Maqbool, “Global Scenario of Conflict Induced Displacement: A Survey of Literature,”
Research Review Journals in Research Review International Journal of Multidisciplinary (2019):
46–50.
3

Brendan Ciarán Browne and Casey Asprooth-Jackson, “From 1969 to 2018: Relocating Historical
Narratives of Displacement during ‘the Troubles’ through the European Migrant Crisis,” Capital and
Class 43, no. 1 (2019): 23–38.
4

Kylie Bourne, “Beitz’s Two-Level Model of Human Rights and Statelessness,” in Political and
Legal Approaches to Human Rights (Routledge, 2017), 214–225.
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the numbers of displaced people by year, with the changing conditions that cause such
displacement. This focus will show that human displacement is so universal, persistent, and
difficult to curb because its causes are deeply rooted and constantly changing. But one of their
shared causes in the current era, as this study will show, is that governments are losing control over
the societies they govern. As control is lost, repression and violence increase, generating human
displacement. The patterns and forms of such violence are different, but they have similar sources
and results, as this thesis’s four different case studies will show.
After the qualitative and quantitative data has been collected, it will be aggregated into a
report and presented in a thesis with Four chapters and a conclusion. The countries that are the
focus of the report will be compared in pairs: Syria and Yemen as one pair, and Honduras and
Venezuela as the other. Each chapter’s sections will provide a thematic guideline for the report
within which human displacement in Syria, Yemen, Honduras, and Venezuela will be discussed.
During the investigation, it will be possible to examine the most common forms and causes of
human displacement in modern societies. In addition, the research process will provide insights
into the similarities and differences between different forms of displacement including
displacement resulting from natural disasters, climate change, weak governance, and lack of social
support.
The research for this project will be based on data from the United Nations (UN), the
International Organization of Migration, World Vision, the Council of Europe, and the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, among others. In addition to these primary sources,
secondary sources like articles from peer-reviewed journal articles will be used to supplement
information and explore the impact of human displacement in the 21st century.5 Even governments

5

Ilona Millar, “There’s No Place Like Home: Human Displacement and Climate Change,”
Australian International Law Journal 14 (2007): 71; Anastasios Noulas et al., “A Tale of Many
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have data on the displacement of people from places across the world, especially those that are
seeking harbor in other countries either as refugees or asylum seekers.6 The data collected gives an
approximate number of the people who have been displaced over the years, but this data does not
always include the reasons for these changes. Investigating human displacement in Latin American
nations and the Middle East will make it possible to understand the trends in both regions.
Comparing countries in those two regions will be instrumental in determining if there are regionspecific factors that relate to human displacement. The comparison will also be an important step in
gaining a clearer understanding of the social and political conditions behind the human
displacement phenomenon in the four countries.
Causes of Displacement
Human displacement results due to a wide range of factors, which can be classified into
three broad categories including conflict-induced displacement, disaster-induced displacement, and
development-induced displacement.7 The causes of displacement can also be placed into two
categories including displacement of risk and displacement of adaptation.8 The displacement of risk
includes deportations, conflict-induced displacement, and disaster-induced displacement, whereby
a person is forced to leave when risks increase.9 Displacement of adaptation primarily includes

Cities: Universal Patterns in Human Urban Mobility,” PLoS ONE 7, no. 5 (2012): e37027; Vinicius
S. De Stefano et al., “Live Human Assessment of Depth-Dependent Corneal Displacements with
Swept-Source Optical Coherence Elastography,” PLoS ONE 13, no. 12 (2019): e0209480.
6

Asam Almohamed and Dhaval Vyas, “Vulnerability of Displacement: Challenges for Integrating
Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Host Communities,” in Proceedings of the 28th Australian
Computer-Human Interaction Conference, OzCHI 2016, 2016, 125–134.
7

Chris McDowell, Understanding Impoverishment: The Consequences of Development-Induced
Displacement, vol. 2 (Berghahn books, 1996).
8

W Courtland Robinson, Risks and Rights: The Causes, Consequences, and Challenges of
Development-Induced Displacement (The Brookings Institution-SAIS Project of Internal
Displacement Washington DC, 2003).
9

Akhteruz Zaman and Jahnnabi Das, “Injustice versus Insecurity Climate-Induced Displacement in
the Fijian and New Zealand Public Discourses,” Pacific Journalism Review 26, no. 2 (2020): 102–
117.
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voluntary migration, environmentally induced displacement, and development-induced
displacement.10 As such, displacement can result from either natural or manmade causes, but
manmade causes have been shown to be the most devastating because more conflict tends to result
in more conflict, unlike natural sources that do not have such a feedback mechanism. Once
displaced, the displaced persons usually face worse conditions wherever they go because they are
either not welcome or are not adapted to dealing with the challenges associated with living in those
places. As such, regardless of where people are displaced, the outcome of the displacement is
almost always negative and has presented a humanitarian challenge that the world is still working
to address. Of interest is the displacement that results from conflict and collapses of states, whereby
millions of people are left stateless as they attempt to escape their countries of birth.11 The
migration causes a strain on global resources, especially as other countries are expected to host the
displaced people and offer them their resources. Understanding the causes of displacement in detail
can provide insights on how the global community can introduce interventions before the
displacement occurs and mitigate the negative outcomes once the displacement has resulted.
Disaster-Induced Displacement
Disasters threaten the lives of people and force them to leave their places of residence in
search of places where the threats are nonexistent or are less threatening to the lives of people. In
the context of human displacement, disasters are defined as any natural forces or events that have
the potential to have catastrophic consequences. These consequences tend to include the loss of life
and the destruction of property, with many places across being vulnerable to different types of

10

Yang Wang et al., “Perceived Discrimination of Displaced People in Development-Induced
Displacement and Resettlement: The Role of Integration,” Cities 101 (2020): 102692.
11

Amy Maguire and Amy Elton, “Extending a Collective Human Right to Address a Global
Challenge: Self-Determination for Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Stateless Persons,” Austl. Int’l LJ
25 (2018): 227.
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natural disasters depending on geological and climatic factors.12 Any event or natural force that can
be classified as a natural disaster has the potential to cause disaster-induced displacement
depending on its severity and its impact on human life. Some of the most catastrophic disasters
include wildfires, volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, heat waves, landslides, floods, earthquakes,
avalanches, blizzards, and tropical cyclones.13 As people pollute the natural environment through
the release of greenhouse gases from burning fossil fuels, it is expected that climate change will
result in far-reaching environmental changes. The environmental concern of climate change will
result in human displacement once the melting of polar icecaps and the expansion of sea water
results in the rise in sea levels.14 Since it is impossible to know the extent and how the sea level
will rise, there is no way of knowing the number of people that will be displaced from their homes
as a result of climate change. The known factor in the climate change equation is that at least 75%
of the megacities in the world are located by the sea, which means millions and possibly billions of
people will be affected directly and indirectly.15 Estimates indicate that at least 80% of the global
human population lives at about 60 miles from the coast, which puts a considerable portion of the
population at risk. Increasing global temperatures have also been shown to result in more powerful
and catastrophic disasters related to changes in weather conditions.

12

Téofilo Altamirano, “Climate Change, Vulnerability, Social Conflicts and Human Displacement in
the Andes: The Case of Huaytapallana Glacier,” Ambiente, Comportamiento y Sociedad 3, no. 1
(2020): 1–7.
13

Sandeep Narayan Kundu, “Geohazard Modeling Using Remote Sensing and GIS,” in Modelling
Trends in Solid and Hazardous Waste Management (Springer, 2017), 127–139.
14

Mathew E. Hauer et al., “Sea-Level Rise and Human Migration,” Nature Reviews Earth &
Environment 1, no. 1 (2020): 28–39.
15

Johannes M. Luetz and John Merson, “Climate Change and Human Migration as Adaptation:
Conceptual and Practical Challenges and Opportunities,” in Climate Action. Encyclopedia of the UN
Sustainable Development Goals (Vol. SDG 3-Climate Action, Earth and Environmental Science Ed.,
Pp. 1–13). Cham, Switzerland: Springer Nature. Https://Doi. Org/10.1007/978-3-319-71063-1_46-1,
2020, 120–132.
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Natural disasters tend to result in human displacement on a smaller scale whereby
displacements resulting from forest fires and floods even tend to be temporary until the disaster is
over and people go back home. One natural disaster that resulted in considerable movement is the
typhoon Haiyan that affected the Philippines in 2013, whereby it is the strongest storm to have
been recorded once it hit landfall.16 Hurricanes, cyclones and typhoons generate their power from
water that has warmer temperatures. As climate change causes increases global temperatures, there
have been increasing water temperatures as well, which has resulted in increasingly stronger storms
across the world. The UN estimates that typhoon Haiyan resulted in the temporary or permanent
displacement of more than 4.1 million people which indicates the importance of exploring natural
disasters in the study of human displacement.17 The UN report also shows that weather-related
consequences of climate and natural disasters resulted in the displacement of more than 22 million
people, which made disaster-induced displacement the most prevalent for the year.
Conflict Induced Displacement
Human societies are not always peaceful, whereby people will always disagree with each
other based on their differences in demographic factors, cultural factors, or political opinions.18
When conflicts escalate, usually into violence, one or more groups of people are forced to leave the
area they share in the search for another area in which there is no conflict. The conflicts can result
in the movement of people even away from a country, especially in cases where the conflict results
in so much death that people start fearing for their lives. Conflict-induced displacement is the

16

Daniel Fitzpatrick and Caroline Compton, “Seeing Like a State: Land Law and Human Mobility
after Super Typhoon Haiyan,” SSRN Electronic Journal 50 (2017).
17

Maria Regina Hechanova et al., “Evaluation of a Resilience Intervention for Filipino Displaced
Survivors of Super Typhoon Haiyan,” Disaster Prevention and Management: An International
Journal 27, no. 3 (2018): 346–359.
18

Joel Anderson and Rose Ferguson, “Demographic and Ideological Correlates of Negative
Attitudes towards Asylum Seekers: A Meta-Analytic Review,” Australian Journal of Psychology 70,
no. 1 (2018): 18–29.
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consequence of human interactions, whereby groups with conflicting perspectives of the world
interacting can escalate into violence that may result in deaths.19 In an attempt to protect
themselves and their loved ones from the ravages of war or civil war, groups of people migrate
across the world to more peaceful places. The conflicts may not result in war and may include any
forced migration as a result of persecution due to religion race and political views among other
demographic differences. When conflicts are addressed, it is possible for people who have been
displaced due to conflict to go back to their homes, but this is not usually the case because states
that cause such migration tend to be states that lack a stable political system.20
One of the most recent examples of conflict-induced displacement is the displacement that
has resulted from the ongoing Syrian civil war, which has caused internally displaced persons and
refugees.21 The United Nations estimates that at least three million refugees have resulted from the
civil war, and at least seven million have been displaced internally.22 The combined displaced
people from Syria account for more than 40% of the country’s prewar population.23 On a global
scale, conflicts have displaced 16.7 million refugees, 1.2 million asylum seekers, and 33.3 million

19

Eran Bendavid et al., “The Effects of Armed Conflict on the Health of Women and Children,” The
Lancet 397, no. 10273 (2021): 522–532.
20

Sumaira Akbarzada and Tim K. Mackey, “The Syrian Public Health and Humanitarian Crisis: A
‘Displacement’ in Global Governance?,” Global Public Health 13, no. 7 (2018): 914–930.
21

Xi Li et al., “Intercalibration between DMSP/OLS and VIIRS Night-Time Light Images to
Evaluate City Light Dynamics of Syria’s Major Human Settlement during Syrian Civil War,”
International Journal of Remote Sensing 38, no. 21 (2017): 5934–5951.
22

Xu Zhang and Catherine A Luther, “Transnational News Media Coverage of Distant Suffering in
the Syrian Civil War: An Analysis of CNN, Al-Jazeera English and Sputnik Online News,” Media,
War & Conflict 13, no. 4 (2020): 399–424.
23

Samuel Berhanu Woldemariam, Amy Maguire, and Jason von Meding, “Forced Human
Displacement, the Third World and International Law: A Twail Perspective,” Melbourne Journal of
International Law 20, no. 1 (2019): 248–276,
https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=138266597&site=ehostlive&scope=site.
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internally displaced people for a total of more than 51.2 million.24 The widespread human
displacement from regions and countries across the world has given rise to a humanitarian issue of
great concern, which has forced the world to rethink its approach to the issue.25 The large number
of displaced people has even resulted in some nations limiting the number of refugees and asylum
seekers they admit into their boundaries, as human displacement has put more pressure on the
resources in the countries with better political, social, and economic stability.

24

Alma Smajlovic and April L. Murphy, “Invisible No More: Social Work, Human Rights, and the
Syrian Refugee Crisis,” Journal of Human Rights and Social Work 5, no. 2 (2020): 139–144.
25

Bogumil Terminski, “Development-Induced Displacement and Resettlement: Theoretical
Frameworks and Current Challenges,” Development 10 (2013): 101; Jeff Crisp, Tim Morris, and
Hilde Refstie, “Displacement in Urban Areas: New Challenges, New Partnerships,” Disasters 36, no.
SUPPL.1 (2012): S23–S42.
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Chapter 2: Disintegration of the State and its Loss of Control Over Society
International law defines the state as an entity with a defined territory, under the control of
its government, with a permanent population, and engages in formal interactions and relations with
similar entities.26 As such, the state is responsible for protecting the interests of the people within
its territory by eliminating or mitigating any internal or external factors that will threaten stability.
In many of the countries in which there is considerable human displacement, the primary cause is
that the effective control of the government fades or is disrupted to an extent that the state no
longer experiences stability and security. Coups and rebellions are usually an extension of further
underlying issues that threaten the ability of the government to maintain control of its territory. The
disintegration of state structures is usually characterized by the implosion of national authority,
institutions, law, and order, such that the whole body politic ends up collapsing.27 In addition, since
people need their government to hold a certain degree of legitimacy in order to maintain its
statehood, the disintegration of the state structure implies a breakdown of the values on which the
state bases its legitimacy. Once the state loses its legitimacy, citizens are forced to withdraw into a
form of nationalism based on ethnic or religious affiliation that ends up becoming their residual and
viable form of identity.28 In many cases, when the state structures collapse, it falls onto various
factions to maintain law and order, as well as exerting other forms of authority. While the state
itself will not disappear, it will lose the e capacity to engage in normal government functions.

26

Alison K Eggers, “When Is a State a State-The Case for Recognition of Somaliland,” BC Int’l &
Comp. L. Rev. 30 (2007): 211.
27

D. Elwood Dunn and I. William Zartman, Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of
Legitimate Authority, International Journal, vol. 51 (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995).
28

Roger Petersen, “Identity, Rationality, and Emotion in the Processes of State Disintegration and
Reconstruction,” in Constructivist Theories of Ethnic Politics (Oxford University Press New York,
2013), 387–421.
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Levels of State Disintegration
The disintegration of the state varies in terms of intensity, and the effects may be felt
differently in different parts of the country depending on the overall makeup of the population and
its government. At the lowest levels of state disintegration, governments remain in office, but their
control of the territory and the population is limited considerably.29 In higher levels of state
disintegration, some crucial structures may remain functional such that the state is represented in
the international community, but is comprised of multiple warring factions. In the higher extreme,
the government no longer holds uncontested power and the ability to use force, such that anyone
with the resources to hire an armed force will do so at will. The regular armed forces that are
controlled by the government usually remain functional, but they too end up breaking down over
time due to lack of absolute control. Even more concerning is the tendency for private armies and
security departments to emerge and proliferate, and instead of offering security like regular armed
forces, they tend to be parts of profit-oriented conglomerates that are outside state control.30 The
process of shifting from low state disintegration to higher state disintegration tends to follow a
format in which the government gradually loses its ability to maintain law and order. Over time,
the dysfunctional government will end up resulting in a failed state that can hardly ensure the
wellbeing of the people within their territories, hence the tendency for human displacement.31 As
the state is supposed to ensure that the rights and interests of the people are protected, if this fails
then people may be forced to move in order to protect their own lives or in search of better
opportunities.

29

Brigitta Malagurski et al., “Topological Disintegration of Resting State Functional Connectomes
in Coma,” NeuroImage 195 (2019): 354–361.
30

Farideh Farhi, “State Disintegration and Urban-Based Revolutionary Crisis: A Comparative
Analysis of Iran and Nicaragua,” Comparative Political Studies 21, no. 2 (1988): 231–256.
31

Teo Ballvé, “Everyday State Formation: Territory, Decentralization, and the Narco Landgrab in
Colombia,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 30, no. 4 (2012): 603–622.
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Many of the most dysfunctional states are still recognized as part of the international
community and are even represented in organizations like the United Nations.32 Some of the main
predictors of total disintegration, many of which start even in the early stages, include chaos and
crime, whereby the government starts losing its ability to prevent members of the population from
committing crimes.33 Governments that are facing near breakdown of state structures tend to lash
out against the people, as evident in how some governments may use excessive force to quell riots
and protests. When the people question the injustices of the government, they can be thrown in jail
or receive threats to their lives, and displacement due to persecution can start happening even in
these early stages. If a government feels that its legitimacy is being threatened by the words or
actions of its people, it will do anything to protect itself. Some of the actions by these governments
can even result in the death of people before they start leaving the country in search of places
where their safety can be assured. While chaos and crime may result in the displacement of a few
people at first, when the state structures collapse completely, then people are displaced en masse.34
The state even loses the characteristic of being a state, as there are even no longer representatives
of the people with whom the global community or humanitarian organizations can interact.
Yemen and Syria
Yemen
Yemen has been in crisis since 2015, causing this country in the south of the Arabian
Peninsula to endure one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. More than four million people of
Yemen have been displaced from their homes while more than 20 million are facing the dire need

32

Markus Patberg, “Can Disintegration Be Democratic? The European Union Between Legitimate
Change and Regression,” Political Studies 68, no. 3 (2020): 582–599.
33

Michael J Mazarr, “The Rise and Fall of the Failed-State Paradigm Requiem for a Decade of
Distraction,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 1 (2014): 0–1.
34

Glenn M. Schwartz, “From Collapse to Regeneration,” After Collapse: The Regeneration of
Complex Societies 9780816521 (2010): 3–17.
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of humanitarian assistance.35 While Yemen was already one of the poorest Middle Eastern
countries, the conditions in the country continued deteriorating after the breakout of violence in
March 2015. The violence has disrupted Yemeni society such that more than half of the country’s
health facilities have either been destroyed or shuttered.36 Institutional collapse and economic drain
that has been happening over the years have pushed Yemen to the brink of large-scale starvation
for many members of its population.37 Currently, more than half a million people in Yemen are
living in famine-like conditions, and at the start of 2021, about 16 million more people are facing a
considerable risk of going hungry within the year.38 The people of Yemen have become a burden
for the rest of the world, especially as the violence has resulted in their internal and external
displacement.39 As long as they have been displaced from their homes, the people of Yemen have
been suffering and need humanitarian aid from the rest of the world, a situation that has been
worsened by the poor economic and climate conditions in the country.
Although most people in Yemen are at risk of starvation and the associated suffering, at
most risk are the people of Yemen who have been displaced from their homes as a result of the
violence. About 67% of the displaced Yemenis, which includes 2.6 million people, are food
insecure, and research indicates that their risk of falling into hunger is at least four times as much
as other members of the Yemeni population. The COVID-19 pandemic has made the situation of

35

Mara A Leichtman, “Humanitarian Aid in Yemen Through the Eyes of a Kuwaiti Role Model for
Women,” Journal of Muslim Philanthropy & Civil Society 4, no. 2 (2020): 89–114.
36

Mohammed M. Alassar et al., “Severe Dehydration among Cholera Patients in Yemen: A Cohort
Profile,” Germs 10, no. 4 (2020): 338–345; Jeannie Sowers and Erika Weinthal, “Humanitarian
Challenges and the Targeting of Civilian Infrastructure in the Yemen War,” International Affairs 97,
no. 1 (2021): 157–177.
37

Carlisle Ford Runge and Linnea Graham, “Hunger as a Weapon of War: Hitler’s Hunger Plan,
Native American Resettlement and Starvation in Yemen,” Food Policy 92 (2020): 101835.
38

Laura Graham, “Prosecuting Starvation Crimes in Yemen ’ s Civil War,” Case W. Res. J. Int’l L.
52, no. 1 (2020): 267.
39

David James Cantor and Jacob Ochieng Apollo, “Internal Displacement, Internal Migration, and
Refugee Flows: Connecting the Dots,” Refugee Survey Quarterly 39, no. 4 (2020): 647–664.

12

the displaced Yemenis at even greater risk due to deteriorating economic and healthcare
conditions.40 Some of the preventable diseases for which the people of Yemen have been suffering
include diphtheria, dengue fever, cholera, and measles.41 The healthcare situation is worsened by
the fact that about half of the country’s healthcare institutions are nonfunctional, and people cannot
even be treated for common ailments. Although Yemen is suffering from a six-year-long conflict,
the country still plays host to at least 135,000 asylum seekers and refugees from Ethiopia and
Somalia.42 As a consequence, Yemen is the largest host for Somali refugees in the world, which
means that the country still attempts to do the right thing for displaced people despite its own
challenges.43 The global community should therefore step up its efforts of supporting Yemen in its
human displacement and humanitarian challenges, including attempting to address the course of the
conflict.
The UNHCR has been working with other similar organizations to send aid to Yemenis
who have fallen victim to the country’s six-year-long civil war that has resulted in the displacement
of millions.44 The civil war as well as the displacement of locals have made it difficult to
impossible for relief efforts to reach the people, but despite the challenges, the UNHCR is still

40

Abdulsamad Taresh Abdullah et al., “COVID-19 Pandemic in the Midst of Civil War: Planetary
Health and Plant Omics Field Notes from Aden, Yemen,” OMICS mA Journal of Integrative Biology
24, no. 12 (2020): 685–687.
41

Paul Eze et al., “Morbidities & Outcomes of a Neonatal Intensive Care Unit in a Complex
Humanitarian Conflict Setting, Hajjah Yemen: 2017-2018,” Conflict and Health 14, no. 1 (2020): 1–
10; Alassar et al., “Severe Dehydration among Cholera Patients in Yemen: A Cohort Profile.”
42

Jera Lego, “Criminalized and Vulnerable: Refugees And Asylum Seekers in Thailand and
Malaysia,” in Agency and Immigration Policy (Transnational Press London, 2020), 7–28.
43

Alex de Waal, “The Horn of Africa and the Yemen Crisis,” in Global, Regional, and Local
Dynamics in the Yemen Crisis (Springer, 2020), 195–208; Brendon J. Cannon and Federico Donelli,
“Asymmetric Alliances and High Polarity: Evaluating Regional Security Complexes in the Middle
East and Horn of Africa,” Third World Quarterly 41, no. 3 (2020): 505–524.
44

Hameed Alqatabry and Charity Butcher, “Humanitarian Aid in Yemen: Collaboration or CoOptation?,” Journal of Peacebuilding and Development 15, no. 2 (2020): 250–255.
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doing something to provide humanitarian aid.45 The priorities of the global community in its
support of the people of Yemen are based on the idea of Yemen being a disintegrated state.46 Since
the state has been unable to provide the people with security, they need to remain safe in their
homes, people have had to leave their homes, and depend on the international community for
protection. In addition to the provision of protection to displaced Yemenis, the global community
also provides millions of Yemenis with a sense of food security due to the risk of starvation they
face.47 In an attempt at enabling displaced families to meet their basic needs since the government
has failed to do so, the UNHCR provides them with shelter, cash assistance, legal aid, essential
household supplies, and registration services.48 Through the cash assistance program, the UNHCR
has been able to reach at least a million people every year over the years. The COVID-19 pandemic
has strained the UNHCR resources even further as it has had to support healthcare facilities by
distributing hygiene kits as well as supporting activities for raising awareness about the pandemic.
Syria
Like the human displacement in Yemen, the human displacement in Syria is the result of
civil war and has caused considerable degrees of displacement that are comparable to those that
have been experienced in Yemen. Another similarity between the two countries is that the civil war
in Syria is also the consequence of political disagreements, with the state having failed to hold on
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to its legitimacy, power, and unity.49 In both cases, different political factions believe they have the
right to power in the country and managed to set the people of the country against each other,
hence the bloody civil wars.50 For both Syria and Yemen, the warring political factions have
managed to gain both local and foreign supporters to their cause, which has served to not only
prolong the civil wars but also to make them more deadly to all participants.51 Since many people
just want to live their day-to-day lives in peace, the political conflict only serves to push them out
of their homes if they can hope to protect themselves and their loved ones from being killed in the
process. However, unlike the Yemeni government that failed to protect its military camp from
militants, the Syrian civil war started when the government started using violence in the
suppression of demonstrations.52 In Syria, the extensive use of military, police, and paramilitary
forces resulted in the formation of opposition militias, and the conflict escalated to a full-fledged
civil war.
Regardless of the differences in how the civil wars originated, both were a manifestation of
a disintegrating state in which the government was losing the ability to protect themselves and the
people. Governments that lash out against their people or allow militias to mete out violence
against their people are failing governments that are losing their legitimacy and hold on power.53
The outcomes of the Syrian civil war, which officially started in March 2011, are similar to the
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outcomes of the Yemeni civil war, especially in regard to human displacement.54 In addition to the
many deaths resulting from the civil war, the Syrian civil war has also torn the country apart and
resulted in the deterioration of standards of living for Syrians by decades.55 Since the Syrian civil
war has lasted for a decade, it is more renowned than the civil war in Yemen, and it has resulted in
the largest displacement and refugee crisis in recent human history. Like the displaced Yemenis,
displaced Syrians have ended up becoming a considerable burden for the rest of the world,
whereby many countries have had to take in large numbers of Syrian refugees.56 The resources of
many countries have even been strained so much that they no longer want to admit refugees from
Syria to protect the welfare of their own people.
The human displacement of the people of Syria is a combination of both internal
displacement and external displacement, with each group presenting unique challenges for Syria
and the rest of the world. Internally displaced Syrians include about 6.2 million people who left
their homes running away from the conflict and violence that have characterized Syria since
2011.57 In addition to the 6.2 million internally displaced Syrians, about 5.6 million people of
Syrian origin can be found in countries across the world.58 The refugees from Syria are those
people who opted to leave the country as a result of their displacement instead of just changing
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their location within Syria. The Syrian refugees have ended up becoming such a burden to the
global community that many nations have even considered limiting the number of Syrian
employees they should accept.59 Together, both the internally displaced Syrians and the Syrian
refugees make up about 12 million people who are in dire need of humanitarian assistance. The
displacement situation in Syria is made even more severe because more than half of those that are
negatively affected by the refugee crisis are young children who cannot even earn a living given
the opportunity.
Similar to the situation in Yemen, the conflict in Syria has resulted in the destruction of
public amenities, which were not adequately funded, resulting in even more far-reaching
challenges. As a result of the violence accompanying the Syrian civil war, public amenities like
sanitation systems, water, utilities, schools, hospitals, and health centers were either destroyed or
damaged. The people displacement that resulted in Syria can be attributed to the fact that the
violence that the people faced broke their business and social ties such that they had no option but
to abandon their own homes. The level of state breakdown and dysfunction in Syria takes a
different path from that of Yemen in which the conflict is primarily political. In Syria, while there
is a political element in the conflict and the resulting human displacement, the civil war has
devolved into a sectarian conflict that has divided the country along religious lines. With the
religious groups in Syria in opposition with each other, they have ended up affecting the whole of
the Middle East, such that fighting has even overflowed for other countries. In addition, unlike
Yemen in which external interference is limited, the Syrian conflict suffers from heavy influence
59
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from interventions by the international community.
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Chapter 3: Growing Autocracy
While the political dysfunction in the Middle East comes primarily from different political
factions wanting to take power for themselves, the situation in Latin America is different.60 The
main cause of strife in Latin America is the inability of governments to protect their people from
crime, whereby organized crime has taken root in most South American nations.61 Organized crime
controls a considerable portion of the lives of south Americans, such that many hardly ever know a
life in which their day-to-day lives are not controlled by criminals. Even if the governments are
working towards making improvements and enabling the people to advance economically and
personally, a history of abuse by the governments has resulted in people losing trust in their
governments.62 Criminals have such a strong hold on the economic and political systems in these
nations that the people of South America have all but given up on the ability of governments to
protect them. Members of organized crime syndicates have infiltrated the Latin American
governments such that it is nearly impossible to find a government that has yet to be infiltrated by
criminal organizations.63 Lack of trust in governments coupled with the inability of governments to
protect the people from crime has forced many Latin Americans to engage in protests against their
governments.64 These protests are aimed at getting the attention of the governments and
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encouraging them to change for the wellbeing of their people, even if achieving any change has
proven to be difficult.
In Latin American nations, one regime is usually substituted for a worse one, as indicated
by the Mexican revolution in which different leaders used a wide range of tactics to gain control of
the country.65 Currently, people are engaging in antigovernment protests that can be sustained for
months and may turn violent resulting in the deaths of people.66 Many Latin Americans have been
displaced and forced into exile by the protests and other violent activities, as the governments use
force and other forms of manipulation to remain in power. As violence and crime have disrupted
the day-to-day lives of the people in Latin America, many people have started supporting
authoritarianism.67 While Latin American nations have been undergoing changes to incorporate
democratic tendencies in their political systems, the situation seems to be getting worse. Instead of
having democratic systems that lack the institution and structure they need to maintain order,
people have been shifting in their political beliefs, and many hold that it is better to have an
authoritarian system of government instead of a dysfunctional democracy.68 The governments have
been unable to maintain control of the state, such that the people are usually left to fend for
themselves in villages and towns that are under the control of criminals and criminal organizations.
The demonstrations have been observed in countries like Chile, Paraguay, Colombia, Peru,
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Ecuador, and Bolivia, and have different impacts and origins.69 Despite the varying causes of
protests and increasing support for autocracy, the violence and resulting displacement in Latin
American nations like Honduras and Venezuela have much in common.
As young democracies, South American nations are characterized by high rates of election
fraud and election violence, such that in many cases there is usually no clear winner in elections. In
addition, as insecurity and crime makes the country challenging for any person to travel, the cost of
transport in the countries has been increasing continuously.70 With the inability of governments to
keep the cost of transport in check, the people have become even more aggravated, and the
frequency, length, and intensity of their protests have increased considerably.71 These protests have
ended up making countries that were already unsafe and difficult to live in even more challenging
to locals, with many opting to leave their homes or even the countries altogether. The protests and
the accompanying increases in the cost of living are an indicator of the people of South America
expressing their frustration with the status quo of the politics in their countries.72 In addition,
demonstrations are a protest against the rampant poverty, corruption, and economic inequality that
characterizes many of the countries in Latin America without governments taking any action to
address them. The mass protests in South America are an indicator that many people across Latin
America are tired of the state of their nations, and some believe that the mass protests are a positive
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turn of life in Latin America.73 The challenge to the status quo is mainly being driven by leftists
and young people who are informed enough to want their nations to experience positive change.
The protests in South America have been highly polarizing, as many people do not know
how their countries will turn out if the political systems change, as the democratization has not
turned out well for Latin American countries and their people. The people in South American
countries hold different views of the protests, with some countries like Chile having almost
universal support while some countries like Columbia have less support due to their conservative
nature.74 Human displacement in modern Latin America has primarily resulted from the protests
and the associated crime, with the disruption of day-to-day lives and the turning of towns into
conflict zones forcing many to leave their homes. The displacement has also become exacerbated
by increasing levels of resentment among the people, as the governments have been unable to
address the protests and unite people towards achieving mutually beneficial progress. There have
also been widespread concerns that Latin American countries have been experiencing the
unraveling of social order, such that many have been forcefully displaced because they cannot be
protected by the government and its representatives.75 These perceptions have been driving more
and more south Americans to believe that an autocratic approach to the government may be the
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solution to the challenges they are facing.76 As democratic governments usually allow for a
considerable degree of freedom, they are even more prone to corruption than autocracies, hence the
reason they have been failing to maintain law and order in the countries.
As protests increase, more people are losing faith in their governments, as the protests have
been exacerbating already challenging living conditions for people in many Latin American
countries. While the intention of the protests is to bring social and political changes peacefully,
they tend to escalate into violence and remind the people of South America about the times they
have had to live their lives in the face of persecution by criminal organizations and political
bodies.77 The protests have forced people to remember a time when, while life was not perfect,
there was no power vacuum because autocrats tend to exert absolute control over most elements of
the lives of the people. While young people and leftists support the protests because they want to
change, many people just want to live their day-to-day lives with minimal to no disruptions that
may end up with them being displaced from their homes. Many people across Latin American
nations believe that the countries need strong autocratic leaders, even if the leader need not have
been elected by the people.78 The number of people who support autocratic leadership has been
increasing as the countries become more unstable, which is an indicator that democracy may not be
the best solution for all countries. Even in the Middle East, the Arab Spring did not necessarily
result in more stability, as more and more people are still experiencing violence and displacement,
76

Javier Corrales, “Authoritarian Survival: Why Maduro Hasn’t Fallen,” Journal of Democracy 31,
no. 3 (2020): 39–53; Sebastian Hellmeier and Nils B. Weidmann, “Pulling the Strings? The Strategic
Use of Pro-Government Mobilization in Authoritarian Regimes,” Comparative Political Studies 53,
no. 1 (2020): 71–108.
77

Doran, “The Hidden Face of Violence in Latin America: Assessing the Criminalization of Protest
in Comparative Perspective.”
78

Elisabet Dueholm Rasch, “Citizens, Criminalization and Violence in Natural Resource Conflicts in
Latin America,” European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, no. 103 (2017): 131–
142; Daniel Lvovich, “Authoritarianism, Nationalism, Fascism and National Security Doctrine: The
Debate on Latin American Southern Cone Dictatorships,” in Reactionary Nationalists, Fascists and
Dictatorships in the Twentieth Century (Springer, 2019), 327–344.

23

sometimes worse than when the countries were under authoritarian rule.79 While the global
community discusses whether all nations need democracy, it is the locals in the different countries
who pay the price either through violence or displacement during the transition period.
Expectations of long-term political change in the countries as a result of the protests is a
positive outlook for nations that have been experiencing instability for years, especially as they
transitioned to become democracies.80 Since the protests have been happening under the watch of
democratically elected governments, many people have lost faith in their governments, as these
regimes do not seem to have a solution to the challenges they are facing.81 Instead, many people
have been left to fend for themselves as they watch their countries become even more violent with
no respite in sight. South Americans who are opposed to the protests are also more likely than other
South Americans to support the idea of presidents dissolving Congress and leading the country
without a legislature.82 Leading without a legislature is referred to as an executive coup, and many
believe that such an approach to leadership is an excellent strategy for leading Latin American
countries at times when they are facing far-reaching difficulties. The increasing tolerance for an
authoritarian approach to governance is an indicator that the people do not think their current
governments are capable of keeping violence and crime in check.83 If a government cannot either
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forcefully stop protests or address the grievances of protestors, then it can be assumed to have
failed, and the only way forward would be to change the form of government.84 For Latin
American nations that have had a complicated relationship with democracy over the years, the only
logical alternative to democracy is an autocracy, with autocratic leaders being seen as the only
solution to the failings of democratic governance.
In Latin America, many of the countries in the region have historically been dictatorships,
with many having experienced some changes, but even the introduction of elections did not stop
them from being autocratic.85 When a nation has been a military dictatorship for most of its recent
history, then attempts at introducing a democratic approach to governance will be overrun by
authoritarian tendencies.86 Most of the countries in Latin America started transitioning from being
military dictatorships to becoming democracies in the 1980s, a process that is still underway.
However, as the inefficiencies and shortcomings of a democratic approach become more apparent
to more people, there has been declining support for democracies in Latin America starting 2010.87
Currently, less than half the people in Latin America hold the belief that the best approach to
governance is democracy. The political context in Latin America has caused the people to believe
that only through autocratic leadership is it possible for crime and violence to be addressed
adequately. As indicated by the progress made in developed countries, representational governance
is the first step in achieving sufficient political and social stability that should result in better
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economic performance.88 However, introducing democracy in places where all people have known
is violence and dictatorship tends to leave a feeling of a power vacuum. The power vacuum that
results from democratization ends up resulting in the proliferation of crime and violence, which is
exactly what is happening in recently democratized nations like Nigeria, Egypt, and Libya among
many others.
The people in Latin America are most likely supporting authoritarian leadership because of
the poor relationship that the region is having with democracy, as well as the possible manipulation
that is being done by dictatorships. Dictatorships in 21st century Latin America are increasingly
using democracy as a tool to legitimize authority, consolidate power, and repress their citizens.
This piece considers the recent examples of Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Honduras. 89 21st-century
dictatorships in Latin America are increasingly ‘democratic’. In their various forms and stages,
these carefully engineered and gradually implemented regimes do not reject but are using
democracy as the most effective way to legitimize their authority and justify their brutal
repression.90 Unlike the military dictatorships that rejected democracy across the region during the
20th century (e.g., Augusto Pinochet in Chile, Reynaldo Bignone in Argentina, Fidel Castro in
Cuba, Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in Colombia, Alfredo Stroessner in Paraguay, Castelo Branco in
Brazil, Luis García Meza in Bolivia, Maximiliano Hernández in El Salvador, or Rafael Trujillo in
the Dominican Republic), modern dictatorships in Latin America use democracy not only to attain
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but also eventually to retain power and, in the process, legitimize their political authority.91 This
phenomenon can be referred to as “democratic blending”: a masked transformation of democratic
institutions, principles, and the rule of law that allows elected yet steadily authoritarian
governments to benefit from the appearance of democracy while constructing the rules of a
dictatorship.
Governments that successfully push forward this portrayal of democracy often seize the
institutional (security forces, branches of government) and non-institutional (media, opposition)
structures of power that either limit, supervise, or counterbalance their authority.92 Rather than
promoting the will of the people or a social agreement on the distribution of power, democracy in
this context becomes the perfect masquerade with which to advance the dictator’s will and prevent
the distribution of power.93 This phenomenon can be referred to as “democratic delusion”: an
illusory sense of constitutional authority designed to develop disguised dictatorships. Once it
blends, democracy is no longer a system of government but a tool of maintaining power for a
repressive regime. This piece will discuss three recent examples of these phenomenon in Latin
America: Nicaragua, Honduras, and Venezuela. The case of Nicaragua is revealing. Since the
democratic election of Daniel Ortega as President of Nicaragua in 2006, Ortega and his wife, Vice-
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President Rosario Murillo, have created one of the most autocratic regimes in the region.94 After
getting control of the National Assembly (by winning 71 out of 92 seats), the Supreme Court (by
appointing 11 out of 16 justices), and the Supreme Electoral Council, Ortega’s government
successfully promoted a constitutional reform process, enabling him to run for three consecutive
terms while reducing the number of votes required to be elected.
At present, opposition in Nicaragua is non-existent. And the only remaining independent
force, the students’ movement, has faced a violent crack-down by security forces and paramilitary
groups all over the country, which in recent weeks has resulted in more than 81 people being killed,
838 injured, and 438 arrested.95 The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in
Geneva has called these deaths “unlawful killings” while the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights has insisted on the need of conducting an on-site investigation notwithstanding the
government of Nicaragua's rejection.96 Another critical case of the phenomenon discussed earlier is
Honduras. Using the power of constitutional appointments, President Juan Orlando Hernández
gradually seized control of the Supreme Court of Honduras, which was the only way for him to
circumvent the constitutional prohibition on presidential re-election established by Articles 42.5
and 239 of the Honduras Constitution of 1982 in conjunction with Article 330 of the Penal Code,
the latter of which criminalizes any attempt to modify the Constitution to that end.97 However,
thanks to a Supreme Court decision that declared inapplicable such provisions and authorized the
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indefinite presidential re-election in Honduras, President Hernández did run for a second term,
winning the 2017 presidential election.
Hernández’s government has been accused of electoral fraud, systematic corruption, and
human rights violations.98 Yet both political and criminal investigations against his government
have been diluted through acts of Congress—another institution Hernández’s government now
controls. Worst yet, just as President Ortega has done it in Nicaragua, President Hernández is using
state security forces to repress any protest in Honduras.99 The face of an authoritarian regime in
Honduras is finally emerging. Among all cases of democratic blending in Latin America,
Venezuela represents the most endemic one. Following the democratic election of Nicolás Maduro
as President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in 2013, Maduro gained institutional control
of the state by using the powers granted by Venezuela’s Constitution of 1999.100 After securing the
loyalty of all Supreme Court justices through strategic constitutional appointments, President
Maduro won the sympathy of the military, security forces, and public officials by increasing their
salaries in the midst of the country’s worst economic crisis.101 Furthermore, Maduro’s government
has ordered the detention of more than 1,300 political prisoners while the ANC has passed laws
precluding political parties that did not participate in the 2017 municipal elections—that is, nearly
all opposition parties—from participating in the 2018 presidential election; a political and
authoritarian move that ended with Nicolás Maduro’s re-election.

98

Pablo Navarrete, “Honduras: Britain Sold Spyware to Regime Responsible for Mass Human
Rights Abuses,” Green Left Weekly, no. 1169 (2018): 18; George Rodríguez, “Human Rights Groups
Decry Post-Election Violence, Torture in Honduras” (2018).
99

Antulio Rosales, “Venezuela’s Deepening Logic of Extraction: The Maduro Government’s
Decision to Push Ahead with the Orinoco Mining Arc Initiative Shows That Extractive Capitalism Is
Alive and Well in Venezuela.,” NACLA Report on the Americas 49, no. 2 (2017): 132–135.
100

Corrales, “Authoritarian Survival: Why Maduro Hasn’t Fallen.”

101

Davide Morselli, Stefano Passini, and Craig McGarty, “Sos Venezuela: An Analysis of the AntiMaduro Protest Movements Using Twitter,” Social Movement Studies (2020): 1–22.

29

Maduro’s regime has also muzzled the media through the use, misuse, and abuse of the rule
of law. His government has expelled several foreign correspondents, detained at least 66
journalists, and closed 69 media outlets across the country.102 Additionally, the Constituent
National Assembly recently approved a law authorizing the criminal prosecution of individuals and
media outlets for posting or broadcasting messages that either “encourage” or “incite” hate,
violence, or public disturbance.103 The trend of Latin American autocratic and authoritarian
governments using democracy as a tool in the process of creating dictatorships exposes critical
flaws of democracy as a system of government.104 The replication of these regimes reveals not only
the personal ambition or abuse of power of the leaders discussed here, but also the eventual
dissembling of democratic values (freedom of expression), principles (separation of powers), and
institutions (free vote) that once inspired, and are synonymous with the notion of democracy.105
While the causes of displacement in Honduras and Venezuela are similar in a wide range of ways,
the section below explores the differences by discussing the human displacement in both Latin
American countries.

102

Ray Watters and Ray Watters, “Maduro Makes a Mockery of Democracy in Venezuela,” in Rural
Latin America in Transition (Springer, 2021), 277–303.
103

Holly Prather, “When Words Are Not Enough: The Development of Human Trafficking in
Venezuela Under the Maduro Administration” (University of Mississippi, 2019).
104

Freier and Parent, “The Regional Response to the Venezuelan Exodus”; Steve Ellner,
“Venezuela’s Fragile Revolution: From Chávez to Maduro,” Monthly Review 69, no. 5 (2017): 1–14;
Oxford Analytica, “Maduro and Guaido Face Mounting Schisms in Venezuela,” Emerald Expert
Briefings, no. oxan-db (2019).
105

Doran, “The Hidden Face of Violence in Latin America: Assessing the Criminalization of Protest
in Comparative Perspective”; Tomila Lankina and Rodion Skovoroda, “Regional Protest and
Electoral Fraud: Evidence from Analysis of New Data on Russian Protest,” East European Politics
33, no. 2 (2017): 253–274.

30

Honduras and Venezuela
Honduras
In Latin America, human displacement is closely linked to failure in the governments in the
region to address the organized crime and violence problems faced by citizens. In Honduras,
human displacement takes a combination of both internal displacement and external displacement
depending on the real and perceived severity of the threat being faced by a citizen.106 For many
residents of Honduras, the first step in the fleeing process is leaving one’s home in search of a
sense of safety within the country, with the first step being to move away from places in which
there are high incidences of violence and crime. The internal displacement acts as the precursor to
international migration and is the starting point for a life of trauma and fear that is devoid of any
protection by the government.107 One of the main reasons being internally displaced in Honduras is
challenging is because the government does not have the tools it needs to reverse the process and
introduce protections for the people. While the countries in the Middle East are in denial about the
challenge of human displacement, the Honduran government started working with the UNHCR in
2013 to explore the issue and determine the best way forward.108 The investigation revealed that by
2015, at least 174,000 people had been internally displaced across 20 municipalities between 2004
and 2014, and that the situation was getting worse.
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Despite the government accepting that human displacement is a challenge that needs to be
addressed, it has not done any further comprehensive research like the 2015 study. For instance,
there was an approximately 22 percent increase in registered cases of people who have been
forcefully displaced or at risk of displacement in 2017 compared to 2016. Based on the
information, the main reason for the displacement is that there has been increasing violence that
has resulted in the death of family members and friends.109 Recruitment by gangs, death threats,
and extortions are also key factors resulting in the displacement of people in Honduras, as are
sexual violence, kidnapping, forced disappearance, and intrafamilial violence.110 In addition to the
acts of violence themselves, Hondurans are displaced by fear of repercussions from the perpetrators
of violence. Violence in Honduras is evidence that the government of the Latin American nation is
failing to address the organized crime problem in the nation.111 As such, even in cases where a
person witnessed violence, homicide, or displacement, there is no way to report it to the
government for fear of repercussions from the criminals.
The experiences of violence and displacement by Hondurans have been characterized by
fear of organized crime as well as the reluctance of the people to work with the government in
identifying the criminals. Even humanitarian organizations have a hard time getting people who
have been displaced to identify the perpetrators, which means that the Honduran society is
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characterized by high levels of impunity.112 The high impunity rates are evidenced by the fact that
only a mere 4% of all homicides result in convictions, which explains why people would rather
leave their homes than attempt to get help from their government.113 It, therefore, makes sense that
people who have been forcefully displaced are afraid of reporting their aggressors because there is
a widespread tendency to be persecuted or receive retribution for making a formal or informal
report. The tendency to leave one’s home rather than fight back is also a testament to a country that
is in the control of organized crime and gangs in the form of territorial control over some parts of
Honduras. To date, gangs like Mara Salvatrucha and Pandilla 18 continue to be major players in
the internal displacement of the people of Honduras, but gangs are still not the main cause of
displacement.114 According to research done on displaced people, the major causes of displacement
are the police and organized crime, such that locals have a hard time telling which of the two is the
negative element in their society. The impunity of the police and organized crime is worsened by
the fact that both tend to have political influence in the country as they have representatives in
regional and national governments.
The country has been making efforts at addressing the violence and crime situation in
Honduras, especially in the form of getting gangs in urban areas to lose their territorial control. The
mano dura strategies aimed at addressing gang violence through the operaciones de saturación
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have been shown to contribute to the displacement of even more Hondurans.115 The aggressive and
targeted raids by anti-gang units result in more human displacement since driving gang members
from one place to another will result in them displacing even more people. As the gangs leave
urban areas, they take their activities to rural areas where they introduce both violence and
instability, hence making internal displacement a national phenomenon.116 The overall causes of
human displacement in Honduras include Mara Salvatrucha, Pandilla 18, gangs, criminal groups,
common delinquents, and the police.117 In addition to these causes of human displacement,
research indicates that even the government contributes to some displacement during large-scale
development projects, but this is a minor issue in Honduras. The impact of displacement in
Honduras has yet to be explored in detail, but the main outcome is that it leaves people of all
genders and ages vulnerable in all elements of their lives.118 Although the tendency is to assume
that displacement is an immediate problem that needs to be addressed, in places like Honduras,
Venezuela, Yemen, and Syria, it is a symptom of larger elements of societal dysfunction. Often, the
displacement is the last straw reaction to a series of multiple incidents, threats, and events that
either expose a person and his or her family to violence or threaten one with violence in the longterm.
People will wait until violence or the threat of violence becomes intolerable, after which
they will leave their homes without notice and never come back to their homes in the long-term.
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Leaving without notice or planning makes it even harder to survive because displaced persons will
not carry anything with them, such that they do not have even the basic supplies they need for their
own survival during the time they are on the run.119 As such, when addressing the needs and
interests of displaced persons, the best approach, as indicated by the UNHCR strategy, is to supply
the displaced persons with basic needs like food, clothing, and shelter.120 By working with
internally displaced persons, it is possible to come up with a strategy for encouraging them to work
with authorities in stamping out criminal gangs and organized crime from the country.121 However,
before involving them in making the country better, Honduras needs to consider that its displaced
persons have other needs like the need for identification documents and the need for food.122 In
addition, the government will need to protect the property of displaced persons because they are
usually forced to sell their property cheaply, such that they end up with little to nothing to call their
own.123 The displaced persons even abandon their houses, which are often taken over by the gangs
so that they can have strategic control and use them for the illicit activities that displaced the
owners in the first place.
In Honduras, people who face the risk of being displaced tend to run to their family and
friends in other towns as a first resort, which introduces more challenges to relatives who are
already facing limited resources.124 The pressure on relatives and their families ends up forcing
families into cycles of violence, poverty, and displacement, which means that the problems facing
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the people of Honduras end up becoming worse over time.125 The displacement also means that
most of the people who are affected end up losing their livelihood and facing substantially
diminished earnings such that they can hardly meet their own basic needs. In many cases, internally
displaced persons end up engaging in informal activities like temporary work or begging, such that
they start relying on remittances from their relatives or their savings if any.126 Displacement can
also result if a person is targeted by a gang for the purpose of either extortion or other activities that
may force the person to leave his or her place of work, like a shop owner or street vendor.127 Once
a person has been displaced in Honduras, this means that one will have to live with uncertainty,
trauma, and hiding, with the intensity of these effects being heightened in children, youth,
LGBTQ+ persons, and women.128 The women end up being heads of families with their children
having smaller networks of friends and family to an extent that they end up lacking social circles
they could use for protection.129 In case a displaced woman is alone, she ends up being at a higher
risk of abuse, trafficking, and violence, which are similar to the challenges that LGBTQ+ people
end up suffering.
The displacement that Honduran families undergo is mainly aimed at protecting the
interests of their children, including protecting them from being targeted or recruited by gangs.
Being a young person in Honduras exposes one to more dangers than most young people in the
world can ever imagine, whereby their lives are becoming worse as their governments lose control
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of crime and criminal organizations.130 If the gangs and criminal organizations cannot recruit the
young people, they end up targeting them for kidnapping, trafficking, persecution, and execution.
Honduras is characterized by multiple incidences of homicides and massacres that have forced their
families to take drastic measures like leaving their homes.131 Research indicates that young men are
forced to leave their birth homes because their government does not have any protection program
for men aged between 16 and 24. In Honduras, displaced children account for at least 45% of the
displaced population, which means that the people who suffer the most from the displacement are
the people who can hardly protect themselves even in a country without a conflict. In Honduras, it
has become increasingly difficult for a child to even get a decent education because of the role that
gangs play in schools, whereby gangs can take over schools and use them for their illicit
activities.132 The children also drop out of school at an early age when they are forced to leave their
homes due to violence and the threat of violence from gang members.133 When children are
displaced, they have to transfer schools, which results in higher costs for parents, as well as the
challenges associated with weak infrastructure and school bureaucracy.
Sometimes, families are even forced to separate as a survival strategy, as each of the family
members may be facing a different threat that necessitates a unique fleeing strategy. In this regard,
if only one family member is being threatened, he may elect to leave other family members behind
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and go into hiding alone so as not to put them in danger.134 Over time, the social fabric ends up
being broken down over time, such that in some cases entire neighborhoods have disintegrated as
more people flee for their lives. The degree of risk, as well as the available resources, is an
important contributing factor to the decision to flee, whereby displacement is international only if a
person no longer thinks Honduras is safe.135 Due to lack of resources, many displaced persons end
up remaining in the country in the long-term, even if research indicates that about nine out of ten
displaced persons would want to leave Honduras in search of a better life elsewhere.136 Although
the government of Honduras recognizes the problem of internal displacement, this has yet to result
in positive outcomes like programs and policies aimed at addressing the issue. Even international
organizations like UNHCR have been having difficulties achieving any permanent solutions for
displaced people in Honduras, as many are not even tracked or registered.137 In addition, while the
international and local organizations are providing humanitarian aid, these measures are merely
temporary and unlikely to result in long-lasting solutions for the displaced people in Honduras.138
The only way to reverse the situation would be to address the insecurity issues in Honduras
resulting from gangs and organized crime, as well as coming up with a program for resettlement of
internally displaced persons.
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Venezuela
While the crime and violence in Honduras result from the inability of the government to
keep criminal gangs and organized crime in check, the situation in Venezuela is a result of poor
economic conditions – aggravated by the government’s inability to improve them.139.140 The
country has been experiencing an economic collapse despite the nation having some of the largest
crude oil reserves in the country. Venezuela, like many other nations in Latin America, is one of
the countries that has been pushing towards authoritarian leadership after democracy has failed to
keep the country’s political system stable over the years. Before its current crisis, which started in
2010, Venezuela had so much petroleum revenue that the government was spending much on
social programs that were so comprehensive that the government was offering free heating oil for
the poor.141 The country’s collapse started in 2014 when its GDP reduced to a level that is lower
than the level that the United States had experienced in the Great Depression. As many as 32
million inhabitants of Venezuela were unable to afford food and even the country’s hospitals were
so starved of resources that they did not even have basics like antibiotics and soap.142 As the
economy became worse, the political system spiraled out of control, and accusations of voter
intimidation and irregularities caused President Nicolas Maduro to experience street protests and
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even an uprising. While crime is the main contributor to the failure of Honduras, the decline of
Venezuela was contributed by a wide range of interrelated factors.
Instead of diversifying its economy like other countries with oil resources, Venezuela
increased its dependence on oil revenues over the years such that it had very few other sources of
revenue. As the prices of oil declined, the country started experiencing hard times, such that the
economy eventually collapsed due to other factors like massive social spending, corruption, and
economic mismanagement.143 The United States sanctions against the Venezuelan central bank,
gold mining industry, and oil industry meant that not only did Venezuela no longer have access to
the dollar for international transactions, but it could not even take advantage of the resources in its
possession.144 The sanctions that were designed to put pressure on the Maduro administration
ended up resulting in the near-collapse of the whole country, which then forced people into poverty
and the resulting protests against the government. Instead of introducing reforms as expected,
Maduro got his supreme court to take away the power of the legislature in 2017 such that Maduro
ended up as the de facto dictator of Venezuela.145 The power struggles in the country’s leadership
changed a country that had been host to refugees from its neighbors over the years to become a
humanitarian crisis. While in Honduras the displacement is primarily internal because there are
parts of the nation that are still habitable, most displaced persons in Venezuela have no option but
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to leave the country.146 Internal displacement may have negative effects on the lives of displaced
people, but international displacement is even worse because the people are at the mercy of foreign
nations. By the end of 2019, at least 4.6 million Venezuelans had become refugees, migrants, and
asylum seekers, of whom most of them fled to Venezuela’s neighbors like Chile, Peru, Brazil,
Ecuador, Colombia, and Argentina, among others.
While Honduras has hundreds of thousands of misplaced people because of crime and
localized violence, the violence in Venezuela is much more widespread and intense. The
substantial movement of refugees and migrants from Venezuela has ended up creating a regional
humanitarian crisis in Latin America, while at the same time presenting challenges for the host
nations whose education and healthcare systems have been strained considerably.147 The journeys
made by the migrants and refugees outside Venezuela have been made worse by their lack of
access to clean water and food, vulnerability to gender-based violence, and inability to secure
employment opportunities in host countries. In Venezuela, high levels of violent crime are just one
of the contributors, with hyperinflation playing an even more important role in the ever-growing
humanitarian crisis both inside Venezuela and the region.148 People have been forced to leave
Venezuela for neighboring countries in large numbers because Venezuela can no longer offer them
the essential services they need to support their basic needs. In addition to the challenging
conditions in Venezuela, even the journey to their destination countries is worse, and many of them
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end up losing or risking their lives in their travels.149 Some of the issues they face include safetyrelated issues due to abuse from criminal networks and armed groups, exploitation, xenophobia,
and dangerous terrain.
While even the men are at risk, children and women are especially vulnerable to genderbased and sexual violence and exploitation, including rape, and assault at the hands of the people
they find, as well as fellow travelers. Whenever they need a source of income, many of them are
forced to engage in transactional sex, which eventually results in prostitution and trafficking.150
Research on the migrants and refugees who travel to Colombia from Venezuela indicated that it is
common for women and girls to engage in transactional sex, with mothers often encouraging their
daughters to engage in the practice.151 Since the displaced persons from Venezuela are many more
than the displaced persons from Honduras, the problems faced by the Venezuelans are much more
far-reaching.152 Humanitarian organizations like the UNHCR indicate that a high proportion of the
girls and women among the displaced use transactional sex as a means of ensuring their own
survival due to the challenging conditions.153 There has been an increasing level of awareness
across the world about the situation in Venezuela, and efforts are being put by NGOs, the United
Nations (UN), and host nations to come up with measures of improving support for the migrants
and refugees. A solidarity conference that was hosted by the European Union also focused on how
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the international community can start working on a means of addressing the issues related to the
violence and human displacement in Venezuela.154

154

Alexander Betts, “The Global Compact on Refugees: Towards a Theory of Change?,”
International Journal of Refugee Law 30, no. 4 (2019): 623–626.

43

Chapter 4: Conclusion
Currently, climate change does not seem to be an important contributor to the human
displacement problem, at least not in Syria, Yemen, Venezuela, and Honduras. The impact of
climate change is overshadowed by other underlying factors, most of which are the result of
governments in these countries losing their control of society. Loss of control of society is a sign
that the government is not only losing its legitimacy, but it does not hold sufficient power to keep
all criminal elements in check. Without a means of preventing criminal organizations or militant
groups from terrorizing citizens, governments across the countries have indirectly resulted in the
displacement of millions of their citizens. The large-scale displacement has resulted in
unprecedented humanitarian crises in Latin America and the Middle East, as well we the rest of the
world where the displaced people end up as refugees or immigrants. Humanitarian organizations
like the UNHCR and host countries have had their resources overextended so much, and there is no
end in sight. The human displacement resulting from the political turmoil and criminal activity in
those places has been difficult to handle because they require far-reaching reforms instead of
stopgap interventions like humanitarian aid. While humanitarian aid is beneficial, it is a temporary
solution for any nation, and the only way to protect people in the long-term is by working with the
global communities to promote representative leadership and peaceful resolution of political
differences. The global community can also offer support to the government to prevent militias and
splinter groups from challenging its authority and putting the lives of citizens at risk.
As discussed above, the displacement in the four countries has been the result of political
changes, including disagreements among political factions, and the inability of governments to
provide their people with security. When faced with these challenges, fully functional governments
are supposed to be able to protect their people and work with the international community to ensure
that their authority is not challenged. While international relations played a role, the role was more
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about how countries interact with each other and share their resources after people have been
displaced. For all the countries in this study, international relations played a unifying role in that it
enables countries to offer refuge to displaced people while at the same time donating resources to
humanitarian aid. In both the Middle East and Latin America, neighboring nations play host to
displaced people, and international organizations like the UNHCR give them humanitarian aid. The
challenges, which are supposed to be localized within countries or regions, have ended up
becoming widespread global crises that need the participation of the global community. The people
who have been misplaced in the different countries have had to immigrate to other countries where
their presence is causing pressure on existing resources. The people who end up as immigrants or
as refugees are not usually part of the planning systems of host countries, which ends up ruining
their plans. As a result, many of the host countries across the world have been having a hard time
hosting displaced people, with many even setting quotas.
In all the countries studied here, governments have been losing their hold on societies,
which has resulted in either splinter groups emerging and fighting for power, or crime and violence
increasing. In the Middle East, weakening regimes have resulted in power vacuums that have
caused different political groups to engage in conflicts that have put the lives of the people at risk.
The political infighting in Yemen and Syria has resulted in the displacement of people in large
numbers such that there is a humanitarian crisis in the Middle East and Europe. In their struggle to
hold on to power, the governments of Yemen and Syria have ended up destabilizing their own
countries and forced the people to leave their homes. In Yemen and Syria, human displacement
takes both the form of internal and external displacement, with the number of displaced people
increasing over time, with Syria having more displaced people because its conflict has been longer.
In the Middle East, human displacement is the result of civil war in which the ruling elite have
managed to push their people to fight against each other. The lay people have been driven to fight
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against each other by being convinced that their political and religious differences are supposed to
cause unnecessary friction in their societies. An intervention in this respect would be mass
education to teach people how best they can address their differences without resorting to violence
that ends up breaking down their societies.
In Latin America, the pattern of human displacement is different from the causes of
displacement in the Middle East, whereby direct politics plays less of a role in the conflicts and the
resulting displacement. In both Honduras and Venezuela, the inability of the governments to
protect the people has resulted in both countries being taken over by organized crime and gangs.
While in Honduras the main contributor for the displacement is crime and violence, in Venezuela
equally important are deteriorating economic conditions and political instability. Since the violence
and crime in Honduras are localized, the displaced people are fewer, and the displacement is
localized within the country even if people want to leave. The situation in Venezuela is different in
that the political and economic instability is countrywide, and people are leaving the country in
droves. At the latest count, at least five million people have left Venezuela for neighboring
countries. Though larger in scope, the Venezuelan crisis underscores the similar roots in all four
countries – governments that are losing or have lost control over their societies. While the
government losing control is an important factor, equally important is the need to teach the people
to hold their governments accountable and inform them it is possible to get the leadership they
deserve. The reforms are bound to be challenging, but are not impossible, especially if the global
community is involved in the reform process.
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